

September 2021

# Political Footprint: Biofuels Industry

## In 2020, the Biofuels Industry...

### Spent

**\$43** million on lobbying for special interest policies benefiting the industry

**\$5+** million on campaign contributions to federal candidates in the 2019-2020 election cycle

### Received

**\$3+** billion/year through preferential treatment in the tax system

and hired **444** lobbyists, 322 of which previously held government positions

**\$800+** million in additional COVID-19 relief, biofuels infrastructure subsidies, production subsidies, and other special interest supports

## Since 2016, the Biofuels Industry...

### Spent

**\$272** million on lobbying and campaign contributions

### And Received

**\$12B** or more in federal subsidies through the tax code alone

The federal government has subsidized the U.S. biofuels industry – primarily corn ethanol and soy biodiesel - for decades. Over the last four decades, tens of billions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted on these mature industries. Despite this, the ethanol and biodiesel lobbies continue to seek more government hand-outs and special interest supports, spending millions each year on lobbying and political campaign contributions. Most recently, the biofuels lobby secured proposals for additional biofuels infrastructure and sustainable aviation fuel subsidies within the reconciliation package moving through Congress.

Since the creation of the domestic market for corn ethanol after the energy crisis of the 1970s, the federal government nurtured and maintained the ethanol industry with a steady stream of subsidies. Originally sold as a way to achieve energy independence and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, ethanol has been a favorite of policymakers from the Corn Belt. Ethanol is generally blended into gasoline at a 10 percent level (E10). Ethanol producers have received favorable treatment under the tax code, tariff protection from foreign competition, a government mandate for its use, infrastructure subsidies, and more.


Since 2004, the government has also subsidized the U.S. biodiesel industry. Biodiesel - derived from soybeans primarily but also other vegetable oils, animal fats, and used cooking oil - is blended into fossil-based diesel fuel at various levels (B5, B20, etc.). Like ethanol, the biodiesel industry benefits from government-set biofuels mandates, tax breaks, and infrastructure subsidies.

### **Overview of the Biofuel Industry's Influence**


The corn ethanol and biodiesel industries spent \$257 million on lobbying from 2016 to 2020. Organizations, associations, and companies lobbying for more special interest subsidies and pro-biofuels policies generally include the following:

- (1) The farm lobby, including groups such as the American Farm Bureau and the National Corn Growers Association;
- (2) Biofuels interest groups such as the Renewable Fuels Association, National Biodiesel Board, and Growth Energy;
- (3) The nation's largest ethanol and biodiesel producers, such as POET, Valero, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Green Plains, and Renewable Energy Group; and
- (4) Large corporate agribusinesses such as Bayer and DuPont.

Figure 1 includes expenditures by organizations, associations, and companies lobbying on behalf of pro-corn ethanol and biodiesel policies. Please note that some of these expenditures include lobbying on other issues as well. Information in the following tables was obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics in July 2021. A description of each company, organization, and association, in addition to the amount spent on lobbying by each from 2016 to 2020, can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.



The biofuels industries spend millions on political campaign contributions to federal candidates each year as well. In all, organizations supporting favorable treatment of first-generation ethanol and biodiesel donated over \$20 million to federal candidates during the 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 election cycles, primarily to sympathetic members of Congress and those representing Midwestern districts (in Iowa, South Dakota, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, etc.), where most corn ethanol and soy biodiesel facilities are located. For more information on campaign contributions from the biofuels industry to federal candidates, please see Appendix 3.



## The Biofuel Industry’s Battalion of Lobbyists

Most of the lobbyists working on biofuels issues are politically well-connected. Nearly three out of every four registered lobbyists working on biofuels issues has previously worked for the federal government or in Congress. These “revolving door” lobbyists have political connections with their former bosses, colleagues, and other members of Congress, leading to additional influence when tax credits, renewable fuel mandates, loan guarantees, and other subsidies are up for reauthorization. Eight of the 444 lobbyists working on biofuels issues in 2020 were former U.S. Senators or Representatives themselves, not to mention an additional 322 who formerly worked or interned for a member of Congress, congressional committee, leadership office, or federal agency. Many of these lobbyists previously worked for committees with jurisdiction over biofuels issues, including, for instance, the Senate Finance Committee (controlling tax credits) and Environment and Public Works Committee (which oversees the federal biofuels mandate). Others previously worked in the White House or for various federal agencies, including those that oversee biofuels policies like the Departments of Agriculture and Energy. More information on these “revolving door” lobbyists can be found in Figure 3.

<b>Figure 3: Number of Revolving Door Biofuels Lobbyists (2020)</b>	
<b>Lobbyists Working on Biofuels Issues</b>	<b>Number</b>
Lobbyists working on biofuels issues	444
<b>Revolving Door Lobbyists</b>	
Lobbyists who previously worked or interned for a Member of Congress, congressional committee, leadership, or federal agency	322
<b>U.S. House of Representatives or U.S. Senate</b>	
Lobbyists who were former Senators	1
Lobbyists who were former Representatives	7
<b>U.S. House of Representatives or U.S. Senate Staffers</b>	
Lobbyists who were former staffers for US Senators or Representatives	242
<b>Committees with Jurisdiction over Biofuels Issues</b>	
Lobbyists who worked or interned on a House or Senate Committee	114
Lobbyists who worked or interned for the House Energy & Commerce Committee	9
Lobbyists who worked or interned for the House Ways & Means Committee	16
Lobbyists who worked or interned for the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee	3
Lobbyists who worked or interned for the Senate Finance Committee	19
Lobbyists who worked or interned for the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee	1
<b>Federal Agencies</b>	
Lobbyists who worked or interned at a federal agency	58
Lobbyists who worked or interned at the Department of Energy	5
Lobbyists who worked or interned at the Department of Agriculture	25

<b>The White House</b>	
Lobbyists who worked or interned at the White House	26

### Soaking Up Subsidies

Biofuels and biomass sources were originally sold as a way to achieve U.S. energy independence, reduce GHG emissions, and spur rural economic development. The corn ethanol and soy biodiesel industries were touted as a bridge to advanced biofuels produced from non-food sources such as perennial grasses and agricultural residues. However, the biofuels industry has failed to achieve these sustainability goals despite decades and tens of billions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies.

Corn ethanol production has surged to 15 billion gallons annually over the past decade while production of non-food-based cellulosic biofuels has fallen dramatically below congressional Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandates. To make matters worse, first-generation biofuels such as corn ethanol and soy biodiesel may actually *increase* GHG emissions. Similarly, according to independent analysts, federal biofuels tax credits may worsen climate risks instead of mitigating them.<sup>1</sup> The National Academies of Sciences thus questions whether the federal biofuels mandate – the RFS - will ever achieve its goals despite being enacted 15 years ago.<sup>2</sup>

The corn ethanol industry's primary lobbying priorities have been to: (1) maintain its 15-billion gallon "conventional" biofuels mandate in the RFS; (2) expand the industry's market share by convincing the administration to expand the use of higher ethanol blends (such as E15, a mixture of 15 percent ethanol and 85 percent gasoline); (3) increase subsidies for specialized blender pumps and other infrastructure; and (4) allow corn-based biofuels to qualify for the larger 21 billion-gallon "advanced biofuels" RFS mandate. The industry has had its hand in other U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) subsidy programs not originally meant for it as well, such as the Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) and the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels (BPAB).

The biodiesel lobby has also sought an increased share of government-set RFS volumes, in addition to infrastructure subsidies and an extension of the massive \$3-billion-per-year biodiesel tax credit. The \$1/gallon tax credit was most recently extended at the end of 2019 for five years (retroactively for 2018 and 2019 and prospectively for 2020, 2021, and 2022). The biodiesel industry lobbied hard for this extension even though the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and independent analysts such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have documented the tax credit's market-distorting impacts on domestic biodiesel production, in addition to its wasteful support

<b>Figure 4: Cost of Biodiesel Tax Credit</b>	
<b>Years in Effect</b>	<b>Cost (\$, millions)</b>
2005 - 06	\$28
2007 - 08	\$168
2009	\$512
2010 - 11	\$1,977
2012 - 13	\$2,181
2014	\$1,297
2015 - 16	\$2,563
2017	\$3,250
2018 – 20*	\$8,121
2021*	\$3,092
2022*	\$3,124
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$26,313</b>
* Projected costs - Source: Joint Committee on Taxation	

for the production of low-cost, waste-based biodiesel that would be economical even *without* federal subsidies.<sup>3</sup>

After the ethanol industry lost its largest subsidy – the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) – at the end of 2011, industry lobbyists convinced USDA to unilaterally begin subsidizing biofuels infrastructure through REAP. Congress eventually prohibited USDA from wasting taxpayer dollars in this way, through a provision added to the 2014 Farm Bill, even though \$3 million had already been wasted on these special interest subsidies.

In 2015, USDA again went behind Congress's back by creating the Biofuel Infrastructure Partnership (BIP) program at the behest of the biofuels lobby, earning then- and now-Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack the infamous Golden Fleece Award for wasting taxpayer dollars.<sup>4</sup> The program spent \$100 million of taxpayer dollars on new ethanol blender pumps and other infrastructure such as the replacement of underground storage tanks (since ethanol causes corrosion and leaks in some older tanks). To make matters worse, in 2020, USDA announced an additional \$100 million in biofuels infrastructure subsidies for similar projects through a new Higher Blends Infrastructure Incentive Program (HBIIIP).<sup>5</sup> BIP and HBIIIP's subsidies originate from USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) account, which is normally reserved for dispensing agricultural subsidies and administering other federal agriculture programs. Using CCC funding enables USDA to circumvent Congressional approval and oversight of the program, leading to more federal spending on wasteful programs that Congress never authorized.

The recipients of some of these subsidy programs – such as REAP and BPAB - include corporate agribusiness giants such as Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus. These companies contribute to the political campaigns of Members of Congress and other political candidates supporting the industry's continued special interest treatment. Other large oil companies such as BP and Shell, not to mention energy companies such as Magellan and Kinder Morgan, have received biofuels infrastructure subsidies as well.

Despite the current duplicative mix of federal biofuels supports, the industry continues to seek out sympathetic Members of Congress to increase its subsidies and market share. In December 2020, the biofuels industry successfully lobbied for additional subsidies in the COVID-19 relief bill. This led USDA to announce \$700 million in pandemic-related biofuels payments in 2021 even though the biodiesel sector reported *increased* production in 2020.<sup>6</sup>

Most recently, the House agriculture reconciliation bill included \$960 million more in biofuels infrastructure spending, and carve-outs for aviation biofuels have also been included in the reconciliation package. The biofuels lobby is also actively seeking additional special interest subsidies, such as E15 tax credits, flex-fuel vehicle supports, and more despite an impending industry shift to electric vehicles. While many of these subsidies are being proposed as climate solutions, independent research shows that biofuels production may do more harm than good, creating a lose-lose situation for taxpayers.

## **Conclusion**

After more than four full decades of federal support, it is time taxpayers stop subsidizing the mature corn ethanol and soy biodiesel industries. Ethanol and biodiesel lobbyists are working behind the scenes to increase their share of federal subsidies through new infrastructure, reconciliation, and other legislative packages, the tax code, USDA and Department of Energy programs, and others. These lobbyists are also attempting to increase the number of gallons of corn- and soy-based biofuels that can count toward the federal RFS mandate, especially in preparation for when the Congressional mandates set in the 2007 energy bill end in 2022. Biofuels lobbyists are still attempting to sell current first-generation biofuels as being climate-beneficial, but independent analysts disagree. For these and numerous other reasons, taxpayers cannot afford another year of taxpayer subsidies for the mature biofuels industry that do more harm than good for the climate and create additional long-term liabilities for taxpayers.

*For more information, contact Taxpayers for Common Sense at 202-546-8500.*

## **Additional Materials**

### **Appendix 1. Description of Biofuels Lobbying Groups, Companies, and PACs**

Listed in alphabetical order below are descriptions of selected companies, organizations, and trade associations lobbying for favorable corn- and/or soy-based biofuels regulations and industry subsidies:

**Ag Processing (AGP):** AGP, an agriculture cooperative, owns three biodiesel facilities in Iowa and Missouri.<sup>7</sup> The company used to own an ethanol facility in Nebraska as well. The company has received biofuels subsidies through programs such as the farm bill energy title's Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels.<sup>8</sup>

**American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE):** Since 1987, ACE has worked to promote the ethanol industry and increased demand for corn ethanol.<sup>9</sup> According to its website, ACE represents approximately 100 members nationwide including ethanol producers, corn growers' organizations, industry suppliers, and even companies such as Novozymes.<sup>10</sup>

**American Farm Bureau Federation:** The American Farm Bureau Federation, through its local, state, and national organizations, lobbies on a wide range of agricultural policy issues, including subsidies and regulatory protections for corn ethanol. Farm Bureau Federations are located in all 50 states.<sup>11</sup>

**Archer Daniels Midland (ADM):** Archer Daniels Midland Company was incorporated in Delaware in 1923, a successor to the Daniels Linseed Co. founded in 1902.<sup>12</sup> It is one of the world's largest processors of oilseeds, corn, wheat, cocoa, and other agricultural commodities and is a leading manufacturer of protein meal, vegetable oil, corn sweeteners, flour, biodiesel, ethanol, and other value-added food and feed ingredients.<sup>13</sup> In addition to North Dakota, ADM's biodiesel facilities are located worldwide in the EU, Brazil, and Canada.<sup>14</sup> ADM also owns eight corn ethanol facilities in Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, and Minnesota.<sup>15</sup>

**Bayer:** Bayer acquired Monsanto, an agribusiness giant that has both promoted corn ethanol<sup>16</sup> and lobbied for favorable policies for biofuels in the past – including approval of 15 percent ethanol, or E15.<sup>17</sup>

**Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO):** BIO lobbies on behalf of biotechnology companies supplying corn, fertilizer, chemicals, and various bio-based technologies to agricultural producers, in addition lobbying on biofuels issues.<sup>18</sup> Its members range from agribusiness giants such as Monsanto and BASF to corn ethanol interests such as POET and the National Corn-to-Ethanol Research Center (NCERC).<sup>19</sup>

**Cargill Inc.:** According to its website, "Cargill is an international producer and marketer of food, agricultural, financial and industrial products and services."<sup>20</sup> Founded in 1865, Cargill employs 155,000 employees in 70 countries.<sup>21</sup> Cargill owns three corn ethanol



facilities in Nebraska and Iowa<sup>22</sup> and two biodiesel facilities in Iowa and Kansas.<sup>23</sup> The company also has a biofuels presence around the world, including biodiesel production in Argentina and the EU.<sup>24</sup> The company has received biofuels subsidies through programs such as the farm bill energy title's Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels.<sup>25</sup>

**Darling Ingredients:** The company produces biodiesel and renewable diesel from used cooking oil (UCO) and animal fats<sup>26</sup> and has lobbied for extension of the biodiesel tax credit.<sup>27</sup>

**Deere & Co.:** The most well-known agricultural equipment manufacturer has also lobbied for the RFS and other biofuels policies.<sup>28</sup> Based in Illinois, John Deere was founded in 1837.<sup>29</sup>

**DuPont:** While DuPont sold its cellulosic ethanol facility in Iowa in 2017, the company continues to lobby for pro-biofuels policies at the federal level.<sup>30</sup> DuPont describes itself as a "leader[] in advanced enzymatic and yeast solution" technologies for ethanol production.<sup>31</sup>

**Edeniq:** A company based in California with a field office in Omaha, Nebraska, Edeniq sells its corn kernel fiber cellulosic ethanol technology to ethanol facilities located around the country.<sup>32</sup>

**Fuels America:** Fuels America "is a coalition of organizations committed to protecting America's Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and promoting homegrown biofuels..." representing associations and companies ranging from ethanol producers POET and ADM to large agribusinesses such as Bayer and DuPont.<sup>33</sup>

**Golden Grain Energy:** Golden Grain is a corn ethanol facility located in Mason City, Iowa.<sup>34</sup>

**Green Plains:** One of the largest ethanol companies, Green Plain owns and operates 11 (down from 17) corn ethanol facilities in Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, and Tennessee.<sup>35</sup> Headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska, the company also owns grain storage facilities and cattle feedlots.<sup>36</sup>

**Growth Energy:** Growth Energy is a lobbying organization representing some of the largest ethanol companies, including POET LLC - the largest corn ethanol producer in the U.S. It began lobbying in 2009, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.<sup>37</sup> In total, Growth Energy represents about half of all U.S. ethanol facilities, in addition to its associate members which range from state corn promotion groups to agribusiness giants such as Syngenta and BASF.<sup>38</sup>

**Illinois Corn Growers Association:** a state affiliate of the National Corn Growers Association, the Illinois Corn Growers Association has lobbied to retain ethanol subsidies and continues to push for favorable treatment for corn ethanol.<sup>39</sup>

**Imperium Renewables:** REG acquired Imperium's biodiesel facility in Port of Grays Harbor, Washington, in 2015.<sup>40</sup>

**Kolmar Group:** Kolmar's subsidiary American GreenFuels, LLC, owns a biodiesel facility in New Haven, Connecticut.<sup>41</sup> Kolmar Group AG, Kolmar's parent company, is based in Switzerland.<sup>42</sup>

**Louis Dreyfus:** Louis Dreyfus has a global presence in the commodities business, including processing "grains, oilseeds and sugarcane to make fuel ethanol" and biodiesel.<sup>43</sup> Louis Dreyfus owns a corn ethanol facility in Iowa,<sup>44</sup> in addition to soy, palm, rapeseed, and other biodiesel facilities in the U.S. (Indiana<sup>45</sup>), Indonesia, Argentina, and Germany.<sup>46</sup> The company has received biofuels subsidies through programs such as the farm bill energy title's Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels.<sup>47</sup>

**Magellan Midstream Partners:** Magellan is principally engaged in the transportation, storage and distribution of petroleum products but has also worked with POET, the largest corn ethanol producer in the U.S., to seek federal funding for a dedicated ethanol pipeline running from Iowa to New Jersey.<sup>48</sup> Magellan received biofuels infrastructure funding as part of USDA's Higher Blends Infrastructure Incentive Program in 2021.<sup>49</sup>

**Minnesota Corn Growers Association:** a state affiliate of the National Corn Growers Association, the Minnesota Corn Growers Association has lobbied to retain biofuels subsidies in the farm bill.<sup>50</sup>

**Missouri Renewable Fuels Association:** in the past, the association was made up of the "state's six farmer-owned ethanol plants and the Missouri Corn Growers Association."<sup>51</sup>

**Musket Corp:** According to its website, Houston-based "Musket Corporation is part of the Love's Family of Companies and specializes in commodity supply, trading and logistics across North America."<sup>52</sup> Love's travel centers dispense biodiesel and ethanol.

**NAFA Fleet Management Association:** The association, which has lobbied for extension<sup>53</sup> of the biodiesel tax credit, represents members such as corporations, universities, government agencies, utilities, etc. that use vehicles in their businesses.<sup>54</sup>

**National Biodiesel Board (NBB):** NBB is a national trade association representing the biodiesel industry in the U.S. It is comprised of state, national, and international feedstock and feedstock processor organizations, biodiesel suppliers, fuel marketers and distributors, and technology providers. NBB's members include companies such as Renewable Energy Group, Ag Processing, and ADM that have received USDA biofuels subsidies in the past.<sup>55</sup>

**National Corn Growers Association (NCGA):** based in St. Louis, Missouri, with a lobbying office in Washington, D.C., NCGA's mission is to "create and increase opportunities for

corn growers.”<sup>56</sup> Affiliated corn growers associations and corn boards are located in most states east of the Rockies, with the exception of states like Florida, West Virginia, and those in the Northeast.<sup>57</sup> NCGA was one of the earliest supporters of corn ethanol subsidies. In its past policy and positions papers, NCGA acknowledges its support for federal incentives for corn ethanol and ethanol infrastructure, in addition to higher ethanol blends and other policies that promote the use of ethanol.<sup>58</sup>

**National Farmers Union (NFU):** founded in 1902, NFU advocates on behalf of U.S. farms and ranches in Washington, D.C.<sup>59</sup> NFU is currently active in over 30 states.<sup>60</sup> The organization supports “biodiesel and ethanol blenders’ tax credits and the cellulosic production tax credits and loan guarantees,” expansion of the current RFS, and other biofuels policies.<sup>61</sup>

**New England Fuel Institute (NEFI):** According to its website, “since 1942, NEFI has been a leading voice for wholesale and retail liquid heating fuel distributors.”<sup>62</sup> NEFI has supported the extension of the biodiesel tax credit due to its financial benefits for the home heating industry.<sup>63</sup>

**Novozymes North America:** Novozymes is a biotech company which manufactures enzymes that purportedly increase the efficiency of corn ethanol production. While Novozymes is based in Denmark, its North American headquarters is located in North Carolina.<sup>64</sup>

**Patriot Renewable Fuels:** ethanol facility located in Annawan, Illinois that was acquired by CHS, Inc. in 2015.<sup>65</sup>

**Petroleum Marketers Association of America (PMAA):** According to its website, PMAA member companies “blend biodiesel into on-road diesel and home heating oil to help facilitate the renewable fuel blending requirements established under the Renewable Fuels Standard.”<sup>66</sup> PMAA represents state-based associations such as the Pennsylvania Petroleum Association<sup>67</sup> and the Texas Food & Fuel Association.<sup>68</sup> The association has lobbied Congress to pass extensions of the biodiesel tax credit.<sup>69</sup>

**POET LLC:** from its beginnings over two decades ago, POET has grown to become the largest corn ethanol producer in the U.S. Based in South Dakota, POET owns 28 ethanol facilities scattered throughout seven states, in addition to a demonstration facility in Iowa producing ethanol from corn stover – cobs, husks, stalks, and leaves.<sup>70</sup>

**Renewable Energy Group (REG):** REG’s biodiesel beginnings date back to 1996 when the company “operated under the umbrella of West Central Cooperative in Iowa,” with its first biodiesel facility in Ralston, Iowa.<sup>71</sup> REG itself was formed in 2006, and the company later acquired biorefineries in Texas, Iowa, Illinois, and other states. REG now owns and operates 10 biodiesel and renewable diesel facilities stretching from Texas to Washington state.<sup>72</sup> The company has received biofuels subsidies through programs such as the farm bill energy title’s Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels.<sup>73</sup>

**Renewable Fuels Association (RFA):** as a lobbying organization representing ethanol companies, RFA has advocated for additional federal subsidies and favorable treatment of corn ethanol for nearly 40 years.<sup>74</sup> Its members range from large agriculture cooperatives such as CHS to smaller ethanol producers such as Husker Ag, LLC in Nebraska.<sup>75</sup> On its website, RFA states that it is the “leading trade association for America’s ethanol industry, working to drive expanded demand for American-made renewable fuels and bioproducts worldwide.”<sup>76</sup>

**Southwest Iowa Renewable Energy:** a corn ethanol facility based in Council Bluffs, Iowa.<sup>77</sup>

**Valero:** According to its website, Valero “is the world’s largest independent petroleum refiner,”<sup>78</sup> in addition to a petroleum marketer and corn ethanol producer at 14 facilities in the U.S.<sup>79</sup> Based in San Antonio, Valero was founded in 1980 and over time, acquired its corn ethanol facilities in Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota.<sup>80</sup>

**World Energy:** World Energy owns four biodiesel facilities in Pennsylvania, Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia.<sup>81</sup> Another company-owned facility in California produces sustainable aviation fuel and renewable diesel as well.<sup>82</sup>

## Appendix 2. Lobbying Power of Top Biofuels Companies and Organizations

From 2016 to 2020, biofuels companies and organizations spent more than \$257 million on federal lobbying. The table below includes lobbying expenditures for some of the top entities over the period.

<b>Table: Lobbying Expenditures of Ethanol and Biodiesel Industries</b>		
<b>Rank</b>	<b>Lobbying Organization/Company</b>	<b>2016-2020 Lobbying Expenditures</b>
1	Biotechnology Innovation Organization	\$53,260,000
2	Bayer AG	\$50,910,000
3	DowDuPont	\$38,122,432
4	American Farm Bureau	\$17,351,706
5	Archer Daniels Midland	\$9,830,000
6	National Biodiesel Board	\$8,931,126
7	Valero	\$8,860,000
8	Growth Energy	\$7,540,000
9	Poet LLC	\$7,510,000
10	Fuels America	\$7,060,000
11	Deere & Co.	\$6,570,000
12	Cargill Inc	\$6,450,000
13	Renewable Fuels Association	\$6,150,221
14	CHS Inc	\$5,071,798
15	Renewable Energy Group	\$2,964,000
16	National Corn Growers Association	\$2,630,000
17	Petroleum Marketers Assn	\$2,484,000
18	Novozymes North America	\$2,290,000
19	American Coalition for Ethanol	\$2,280,000
20	Magellan Midstream Partners	\$1,648,900
21	Green Plains	\$1,620,000
22	Illinois Corn Growers Association	\$1,505,000
23	Musket Corp	\$1,370,000
24	Darling Ingredients	\$1,180,000
25	New England Fuel Institute	\$1,030,000
26	Kolmar Group	\$745,000
27	National Farmers Union	\$530,000
28	NAFA Fleet Management Association	\$480,000
29	Louis Dreyfus Group	\$415,000
30	AG Processing	\$235,000
31	Edeniq	\$200,000
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$257,224,183</b>

### Appendix 3. Top Campaign Contributors in Biofuels Industry

PACs tied to Farm Bureau state organizations donated the most money to federal candidates during the 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 election cycles, followed by Deere & Co, Valero, the Petroleum Marketers Association, Bayer, POET LLC, and Archer Daniels Midland. As of Sept. 2020, Valero, POET, and Cargill owned a combined 45 ethanol facilities (primarily corn-based), representing nearly a quarter of all U.S. ethanol facilities.<sup>83</sup> Cargill also owns two biodiesel facilities in Iowa and Kansas.<sup>84</sup> The top 20 campaign contributors in the biofuels industry (from 2019-2020) are listed below.

Top 20 Biofuels Campaign Contributors		
Rank	Contributor	Total Contributions, 2019-2020
1	American Farm Bureau	\$1,175,932
2	Deere & Co	\$777,000
3	Valero Energy	\$582,000
4	Bayer Corp	\$347,400
5	Petroleum Marketers Assn	\$329,300
6	Poet LLC	\$319,800
7	Archer Daniels Midland	\$268,500
8	Biotechnology Innovation Organization	\$238,800
9	Growth Energy	\$210,000
10	Cargill Inc	\$205,500
11	National Corn Growers Assn	\$190,500
12	Renewable Fuels Assn	\$90,500
13	Illinois Corn Growers Assn	\$74,000
14	National Biodiesel Board	\$66,750
15	DuPont Co	\$65,500
16	AG Processing	\$54,000
17	Renewable Energy Group	\$44,000
18	Magellan Midstream Partners	\$18,500
19	National Farmers Union	\$10,000
20	Louis Dreyfus Commodities	\$4,000

<sup>1</sup> [http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pgga\\_178862.pdf](http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pgga_178862.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.nap.edu/read/13105/chapter/2>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/45477-Biofuels2.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.taxpayer.net/agriculture/golden-fleece-blinders-for-blender-pumps/>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.rd.usda.gov/hbiip>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.biodieselmagazine.com/articles/2517610/usda-to-provide-700-million-in-covid-19-relief-for-biofuels>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.biodieselmagazine.com/plants/listplants/USA/>

- <sup>8</sup> <https://www.taxpayer.net/energy-natural-resources/bioenergy-program-for-advanced-biofuels-fact-sheet-2/>
- <sup>9</sup> <https://ethanol.org/>
- <sup>10</sup> <https://ethanol.org/people/member-directory>
- <sup>11</sup> [https://www.fb.org/files/Impact\\_Report\\_2018.pdf](https://www.fb.org/files/Impact_Report_2018.pdf)
- <sup>12</sup> <https://www.adm.com/our-company/history>
- <sup>13</sup> <https://www.adm.com/products-services/food>
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<http://www.biodieselmagazine.com/plants/listplants/USA/>
- <sup>15</sup> <http://www.ethanolproducer.com/plants/listplants/US/Operational/All/>
- <sup>16</sup> <https://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2005/march/11554.htm>
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