



Just the FACTS...

...about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

The LCS was originally conceived to operate in relatively shallow water, close to the coast. Its “primary” missions were to repel small boats, perform mine counter measure activities, find and attack shallow water submarines, and perform various intelligence functions. “Secondary” missions were listed as homeland defense, intercepting other surface vessels, and support of special operations forces. In trying to perform all these widely-varied missions, the LCS was doomed to poor performance at most of them.

1

Fact: The Secretary of Defense has testified the LCS was designed to perform its missions in a “relatively permissive environment” - meaning when it is not being attacked. He has also stated the Pentagon must now determine whether LCS can operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary.

2

Fact: The new Quadrennial Defense Review cites “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability” as a top priority. A likely potential adversary in this region is China.

3

Fact: Previously, the Navy planned a fleet of at least 50 LCS. This would mean 1/6th of a 300-ship Navy would be vessels that may not survive against an advanced adversary. Instead, the Secretary of Defense proposes to end the program at 32 ships, meaning about 1/10th of total ship inventory would be LCS.

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Fact: The Navy has previously spent at least \$8.9 billion to procure 18 Littoral Combat Ships.

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Fact: Buying another 14 LCS, to meet the Secretary of Defense’s current plan, would cost at least another \$8 billion.

Our Take: A ship that cannot operate and survive against advanced military adversaries in Asia, like China, should not receive one more dollar of scarce Pentagon resources. End the LCS program now to save \$1.6 billion in FY15 and \$8 billion through FY19.

