There is apparently no tariff law too old or unpopular to get another look. After the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize broad tariffs, the administration didn’t ask Congress for new authority. Instead, it started searching the statute books.

First came Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. Then came expansive Section 301 investigations reaching across nearly the entire global trading system. Now comes Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the authority the administration is invoking to impose new tariffs on Canada. It’s pretty obscure. In fact, for nearly a century no administration has actually used it to impose tariffs.

Congress enacted Section 338 as part of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Yeah, that one. History has not been especially kind to Smoot-Hawley. Intended to protect American producers during the Great Depression, it instead became synonymous with protectionism, retaliatory tariffs, collapsing international trade, and one of the most cautionary chapters in American economic policy.

Yet, here we are. The administration has returned to that same law in search of another source of tariff authority.

To be clear, Section 338 was not the reason Smoot-Hawley was such a disaster. Section 338 specifically targeted countries that discriminated against American commerce. Congress authorized the President to impose tariffs of up to 50 percent in response. As global trade evolved, Congress enacted newer and more specialized statutes to address particular circumstances. Section 201 responded to import surges harming domestic industries. Section 232 addressed threats to national security. Section 301 addressed unfair foreign trade practices. Each delegated a limited portion of Congress’s tariff authority to the executive branch under clearly defined conditions.

The administration’s actions suggest it is not overly concerned with those distinctions. When one authority becomes unavailable, another is found. When one statute proves too narrow, it simply shifts to the next one. The objective remains the same while the legal justification changes.

The problem, as usual, is the Constitution. Article I gives Congress—not the President—the power to regulate foreign commerce and impose tariffs. Yes, Congress has chosen to delegate portions of that authority over time, and courts have generally upheld those delegations. But those statutes were enacted one by one, for different reasons, to address specific problems. They were not designed to function as interchangeable authorities that collectively give the executive branch a free hand to impose new taxes whenever and wherever it chooses.

That is why the return to Section 338 is so striking. It is not simply another tariff statute. It is another indicator of how far the White House’s search for unilateral tariff authority has progressed, or perhaps digressed. When an administration is dusting off a provision of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to justify new tariffs, it is worth asking whether history is being consulted or repeated.

Tariffs are taxes. They are paid by American importers and ultimately borne by American businesses and consumers. Decisions about imposing those taxes belong to Congress. Lawmakers should stop waiting for the courts to define the limits of presidential tariff authority. It wrote these laws. It delegated these powers. And if they are now being stretched beyond what was intended, Congress has both the authority and the responsibility to stop it.

And while we’re on the subject, this is a good lesson about the dangers of allowing narrow delegations of power to accumulate and linger indefinitely. Like emergency authorities that remain on the books long after a crisis has passed, these statutes invite future administrations to test their limits in ways Congress may never have anticipated. Delegated authorities should be used sparingly, regularly reviewed, and, where appropriate, sunset unless Congress affirmatively renews them. If the last several years have demonstrated anything, it is that broad grants of executive power rarely remain as narrow as Congress originally intended.