The Pentagon’s FY2027 budget request comes in at $1.54 trillion — a 45% increase over current spending. TCS teamed up with the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) on a new report, How to Cut a Half a Trillion Dollars from the Pentagon Budget Request and Strengthen National Security, identifying nearly $500 billion in defensible cuts to acquisition programs.

Gabe Murphy (TCS) is joined by POGO’s Greg Williams and Virginia Burger to walk through the methodology and the specifics: munitions replenishment in the wake of Epic Fury, an F-35 procurement freeze tied to a 1-in-4 fleet readiness rate, the unproven sixth-generation fighter program, cost overruns on the Sentinel ICBM, redundant B-21 bomber spending, Ford-class carrier production issues, the newly proposed Trump-class battleship, Golden Dome missile defense, and Pentagon contractor subsidies.
Full report and cut list at taxpayer.net.

Episode 119: How to Cut the Pentagon Budget

Air Date: July 13, 2026

announcer (00:02):

Welcome to Budget Watchdog All Federal, podcast dedicated to making sense of the budget, spending, and tax issues facing the nation. Cut through the partisan rhetoric and talking points for the facts about what’s being talked about, bandied about, and pushed in Washington. Brought to you by Taxpayers for Common Sense. And now the host of Budget Watchdog AF, TCS President Steve Ellis.

Steve Ellis (00:40):

Welcome to All American Taxpayers Seeking Common Sense. You’ve made it to the right place. For 30 years, TCS, that’s Taxpayers for Common Sense, has served as an independent nonpartisan Budget Watchdog group based in Washington, DC. We believe in fiscal policy for America that is based on facts. We believe in transparency and accountability because no matter where you are on the political spectrum, no one wants to see their tax dollars wasted. It’s July 2026 and we have special guests for you, Budget Watchdog AF Faithful. We just published a joint report with the project on government oversight, POGO, for anyone who hasn’t met the acronym yet. The report’s called How to Cut a Half a Trillion Dollars from the Pentagon Budget Request and Strengthen National Security. We all know there’s plenty of waste in the Pentagon budget, but our guests did something that not a lot of people take time to do.

(01:26):

They took a close look at the Pentagon’s $1.54 trillion fiscal year 2027 budget request and came up with more than another slogan about Pentagon waste. They identified specific defensible cuts to acquisition programs that Congress could make to save nearly $500 billion this year alone. Joining me to walk through it, Gabe Murphy, our policy analyst here at TCS and one of the reports, three co-authors along with the other co-authors from POGO, Greg Williams, who directs POGO’s Center on Defense Information and of the issues we’ve made cuts on. But I also just want to dispel the notion that you have to be some kind of Pentagon expert to have an opinion about all this. You do need to take the time to do your research, but there’s a lot of publicly available information out there that can lead folks to the same conclusions that we drew. Surely not everyone has the time to do that though, and that’s part of why we’re here.

Greg Williams (03:06):

So similarly, this is Greg Williams speaking. I first worked at the project on government oversight over 30 years ago, which is when I learned to read these documents and became fascinated with the idea that one of the great things about the American democracy is that we make so much of this information publicly availa ble. And to the extent possible, we should all dig into that and not leave things entirely up to the experts. That said, in addition to that experience many years ago, I’ve been back at POGO for two years since then. And in the intervening time, I spent my time working at various large companies to get a better sense of what it’s like to manage very large global projects in large institutions like that.

Virginia Burger (03:50):

So this is Virginia. I have been at POGO for a year, similar role to Gabe as a policy analyst. So I spend my days digging into a lot of this material across the spectrum of different defense concerns. But before that, I was a active duty Marine Corps officer for nine years and I was the end user for a lot of these programs or at least was part of the team that was the end user. I have been in the room where we are planning operations that include the F-35, those kinds of considerations. And I would say that exposure to military planning and how these programs actually end up being used in operations is very helpful context when you’re looking at something like this because you can look at all of these numbers on a page and you can look at these giant dollar signs and it can feel very easy to be like, “We don’t need that.

(04:45):

We don’t need this. What that? ” But when you’ve actually sat in the room where the senior planners at the tactical level are deciding how these will play in different operations, you can see more clearly where that connection is or maybe isn’t. And so that helps bring a lot of context as well. So that’s something that I brought to this process.

Steve Ellis (05:09):

Great. So, Budget Watchdog, All Federal, they know their stuff. All right, let’s get into the number that got everybody’s attention. $1,540 billion, AKA $1.54 trillion. Gabe, break down that number for me and how you went about identifying cuts.

Gabe Murphy (05:29):

Sure, Steve. So the 1.54 trillion, which for ease sake I may refer to as the $1.5 trillion Pentagon budget request broken down into a number of categories. There’s the base budget request, which comes to about 1.15 trillion. And then there’s another $350 billion that they’re seeking through yet another round of budget reconciliation. And that gets you to 1.5 or 1.54, and that does not count the additional 67 billion that the Pentagon just requested for a supplemental for the Iran war. So stepping back, this is a massive increase. I mean, we’re talking about a 45% increase in spending over this year’s current levels. So how we went about identifying cuts to this budget request, basically we started by just taking everything back to the fiscal year 2025 baseline. And the logic for that was that this is the last time that Congress actually passed a full Pentagon budget on a bipartisan basis.

(06:29):

Now we did have some exceptions where we allowed the current request to go through at higher levels than FY25 for specific reasons, but by and large, we started with that. We do recognize that in some of these programs that we didn’t look at in as much detail as others, there may be valid reasons to increase a little bit above FY25. There may also be reasons to cut below FY25 levels, but we think this is a good barometer of cuts that could be made across the board in procurement and research where we focused. Now, in addition to that, we went after new units of some of the more wasteful programs while still allowing completion of things that we’ve already sunk dollars into. So things like the F-35 that we’ll get into soon was an example of that. And then in addition to that, we just zeroed out a bunch of programs that we just think are entirely wasteful.

(07:22):

So that was how we ended up getting to nearly $500 billion in cuts just looking at procurement and research.

Steve Ellis (07:30):

Got it. Greg, there’s also a classified spending angle that taxpayers never get to see. How did you all handle that?

Greg Williams (07:37):

Having taken classified programs back to 2025 levels, which as Gabe described, that was the last time we had a reasonable bipartisan consideration of what those spending levels should be. That said, it’s very likely that there’s a lot more that could be cut there, but that really needs to be left to the legislators who get to see the classified briefings that would give them the knowledge they need to consider those cuts. But I think it’s important to realize that these unidentified classified programs constitute more spending than most other nations on earth spend on their militaries in total.

Steve Ellis (08:16):

I’m sure there’s a lot tucked in there. So Virginia, your quote in the press release accompanying this report mentioned munitions. Obviously this is a hot topic right now given the Iran war and reports that the nation’s munition stockpiles have been significantly depleted. How did you approach cuts to munitions spending in this environment?

Virginia Burger (08:35):

Thanks, Steve. That’s a great question. We were very careful with munitions because while we could have easily slashed it all back to FY25 like we did with many other programs as our baseline, we recognized from the jump that munitions were probably going to be the area where we wouldn’t get the most criticism on something like that. And we also recognized that there is a national security requirement to replenish to some degree what has been expended at inordinate scale as part of Epic Fury. And so the way I approached munitions specifically was with a more strategic lens than maybe some of the other areas. I was very careful to look at, okay, what munitions are being asked for? What is the likely timeline of replenishment and how can we factor those things in? So with those cuts specifically, we were a little more precise and we had them go into several different categories.

(09:34):

We looked at munitions where there were capabilities overlap. Are we procuring munitions that do the same thing? Maybe they’re launched from different platforms, but at the end of the day, the end state that they provide us is negligibly different. We looked at generational overlap in several situations. We were procuring different generations of the same munition family and maybe one was being phased out and so we were able to make more aggressive cuts there in favor of one generation or the other. And then there were several situations where we did revert back to the FY25 budget and in some we reverted back to FY26, maybe being slightly more conservative in that cut because we recognized that there is a need to have a little bit more cash spent there in terms of replenishment. And then in some of them, we kept the FY27 requests, but we just cut the mandatory spending or that portion that would’ve come in another reconciliation bill and sort of said, “Hey, you don’t get quite that much.

(10:30):

We’ll give you what you’ve asked for in discretionary. Mandatory is you’re putting way too much cash in there that is just not necessary.” And I think some useful context for these munition cuts specifically, and like you said, it’s a big discussion right now, is that a lot of these framework agreements that have come out just before, during and following Epic Fury though, has Epic Fury started or stopped? We don’t know. Ask again tomorrow. The answer will change. But regardless, these framework agreements that have been announced with munitions manufacturers and sort of the news cycle around them makes it sound like if we spend all this money now it will solve the problem. When the reality is these munitions, even if we ramp up production capacity, are not going to be replenished to operation pre-Epic Fury numbers until in some cases seven years from now. The earliest that some of these systems will be replenished to pre-Epic Fury will be three years.

(11:34):

And so that’s another angle to justify making these cuts that, hey, we don’t need to dump all this cash in there this year. Let’s maybe be a little more strategic about this. Let’s spend some money to begin the process, but maybe we make sure that it’s still being carried through. Maybe we take a more critical look at some of these munitions and their capabilities because another thing that Epic Fury has shown us regarding munitions is maybe we’re putting a lot of money in exquisite systems that aren’t getting us the bang we want for that buck. And so we’re trying to find that balance of the realities of national security requirements and deterrence needs, but also saying cuts can still be made and you still need to take a beat and look at what is strategically viable instead of just rushing forward and following these headlines that say, we’re dumping all this money, it’s solving the problem because it’s not.

Steve Ellis (12:27):

Clearly a lot of thought went into that section because it is this hot button issue. And also clearly some of the lessons that we are taking out of Iran and out of the war in Ukraine is that just to your point, Virginia, is these exquisite expensive weapon systems can be taken care of or outmatched or at least matched by very cheap drones and other UAVs. Okay, speaking of UAVs, Virginia, let’s stick with you and we’ll talk aircraft. The F-35, everybody’s heard of this weapon system. What do you recommend to do with the F-35 and why?

Virginia Burger (13:06):

So I am a certified F-35 hater. I would make t-shirts if I could. I have been for a long time.

Steve Ellis (13:13):

You have our permission.

Virginia Burger (13:14):

Yeah, I’ll send you guys some. I keep trying to get the Pogo merch team to make a F-35 Haters Club shirt. Hasn’t caught on yet, but I have been an F-35 hater for many, many years since my time in the Marine Corps. Look, they are the strike fighter of choice. I have accepted that for my service and what we do with it, but I still have my issues personally with it. That being said, it’s also so expensive. Oh my God, my personal feelings aside, it costs so much money. And so we pointed out that this is the crown jewel of just wasteful programs. It is expensive and it is underperforming. And if you have to pick an example for just the prime show and tell of just the issues surrounding military industrial complex, it would be the F-35. And so we looked at this and said, we need to cut things.

(14:09):

We need to cut specifically the procurement of new systems because we looked at it and saw that we had this increase in procurement for aircraft this year. In FY27, they’re asking for 85 new F – 35s, which is almost twice as many as what they asked for last year. And so we’re like, you’re asking for even more. Yet at the same time, GAO is putting out a report that says only one in four F – 35s in the fleet right now across all the services capable at any given time. That’s abysmal readiness numbers. That is absolutely not performing to a standard that anyone can rely on. If you are a downrange commander and you have a squadron of F – 35s under you, a one in four readiness is bad. That is not reliable. That is not meeting the needs of that commander. So going back to what I bring to this, which is that tactical understanding, no one wants that if they’re the person doing the thing in the fight.

(15:10):

And so that was how we justified making cuts specifically to the procurement of these F – 35s. And our bottom line is, hey, you’re not getting anymore. Until sustainment and readiness can be solved for this program, specifically this aircraft, you shouldn’t be spending even more money on getting new ones. Let’s spend money on solving the problem. Show us that. What could you do to make readiness better and cheaper, sustainment cheaper? Let’s figure those things out and make this a more viable platform, a more sustainable platform, and then we can talk about procurement. But that is not what the numbers are showing us right now. And so we’re like, no more cash for this. You don’t need that at this time.

Gabe Murphy (15:57):

And to that end, we actually left alone a bunch of the funding for spare parts and things like that that can actually help get that readiness rate back up. So we were thoughtful in how we went about cutting this program.

Steve Ellis (16:10):

Basically, don’t throw good money after bad. So sticking with the fighter theme, the Pentagon now wants to build a whole new generation of fighters on top of the F-35, which your cut list would zero out. Gabe, you wrote a report not too long ago about these next generation fighters, the so – called sixth generation. Did the lessons you learned there lead to this proposed cut?

Gabe Murphy (16:36):

Well, they certainly contributed to it, Steve. I mean, looking at just the cost for starters, which is usually where we start with these things, the per unit cost of these sixth generation fighters could be as high as $300 million. That’s like three times roughly the cost of the F-35. Some of the other issues we identified in that report with the F-35, one of the problems that has led to this abysmal readiness rate is a really high level of concurrency, which basically means that they were starting to produce the plane as they were still designing it. And then of course they identified design flaws and that needed new upgrades to the existing fleet. And that has led to 40 some odd different variations of setups for F – 35s that make sustainment incredibly difficult. So as far as concurrency with the sixth generation fighters, the Pentagon has basically just said, “Don’t worry, we’re going to do this in a rational way that doesn’t take excessive risk.” But they haven’t defined that at all.

(17:32):

So it’s kind of hard to take their word for that. I think at the same time, they’re looking at, just like they did with the F-35, an incredibly complex system, an exquisite system, complex mission sets. And that with the F-35 certainly led to a platform that can do a lot of things, but not necessarily that well compared to other aircraft, at least in many categories. So those are some of the reasons why we basically zeroed out these next generation fighters, at least for now in this budget. The F-35 can handle our needs for the moment despite its abysmal readiness rates and pouring more money into brand new systems that may repeat many of these mistakes doesn’t seem wise to us. So you can read more about some of the likely pitfalls of these programs in our report. It’s called Trouble on the Horizon Pitfalls of the Sixth Generation Fighter Aircraft.

(18:24):

It is a little bit dated at this point, but I think a lot of those lessons still hold. And yeah, that’s the approach we took here.

Steve Ellis (18:31):

And it was before your time, Gabe, but we also came out with a report way back called the Unaffordable F-35 and called it a platinum plated spork. All right. So Gabe, sticking with you, let’s talk a little about nuclear weapons policy, which we don’t cover every episode here at Budget Watchdog AF. What did you all cut as far as nuclear weapons here and why?

Gabe Murphy (18:53):

Well, I’ll start with the Sentinel program. This is the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, basically an upgrade to the land-based leg of our nuclear triad. The Sentinel program a couple years ago, the Pentagon basically said that it was 34% over budget, which triggered this mandatory review, made them restructure the program, and they had to re-certify it and they did, but they said the restructured program would actually be 81% over budget. So for starters, we’re not thrilled about that. We actually did submit a FOIA request for some of the explanation for that re-certification. That was two years ago and that remains unanswered. In addition to the cost issues, which are severe, we really just do not need ICBMs anymore to the extent we ever did. I mean, there’s plenty of power and capabilities as far as nuclear weapons in our submarine and bomber fleet and upgrading a whole leg of the nuclear triad to get no new capabilities of any particular value and to continue serving as this nuclear sponge.

(20:01):

I mean, that’s sort of the only explanation that the military tends to give for this. And I think a lot of folks in the middle of the country who are near some of these ICBM silos wouldn’t feel great about that plan of being a sponge in the event of a nuclear attack to absorb those blows. So that’s part of why we went after the Sentinel. We also took a swing at the B-21, which I’ll pass that to Greg to explain our thinking on that.

Greg Williams (20:26):

Sure. So I think one thing that many people may not appreciate is that we’re simultaneously investing in four generations of strategic bombers. B – 52s that have been in service for the better part of a century now. We spent over a billion dollars last year just on upgrading them. Then we have next in line is the B-1, which I think has been in service since the late 1980s. And then the B-2, which has been in service I think since the 1990s. And now we’re investing in a fourth generation, the B-21. It’s not at all clear to me what exactly the B-21 is supposed to be able to do. The B-2 is not already advertised as being able to do. But in any case, we don’t need four different generations of strategic bombers. So we essentially said, look, you get to have two. And we trimmed out any spending that was in the other two generations of bombers.

Steve Ellis (21:25):

Greg, you also tackled funding for new aircraft carriers. What’s the thinking there?

Greg Williams (21:31):

The thinking around the aircraft carrier is a little bit more complex than some other topics because number one, the number of aircraft carriers we have in service is a legal requirement. And so it would take some additional legislative work to change that. And then on top of that, we use our aircraft carriers for a great many things beyond the highly theoretical near peer confrontation. We use them to project our power and to protect commerce throughout the seven seas. So we took an approach that would keep the same number of carriers in service while addressing some of the concurrent engineering issues that Gabe has highlighted in other programs, namely that we’re still figuring out how to build these new Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers while we continue to build them. We have problems with the way they launch aircraft, the way they recover aircraft, the way they move weapons from the hold up to the flight deck to be loaded onto aircraft and with simple plumbing issues.

(22:34):

So you might think that we’ve been building these things since shortly after the Second World War, but clearly some of the design so – called innovations of the Ford class have introduced some complexities that we haven’t figured out yet. So in our proposal, we cut all new Ford-class aircraft carriers while leaving in some of the increases in funding that are associated with the extra maintenance the old aircraft carriers need because the new aircraft carriers are late and that means that we need to keep the old aircraft carriers in service longer. And for a nuclear-powered vessel that unfortunately is a complex and expensive undertaking.

Steve Ellis (23:14):

Right. Simply get it right before you start buying more of them and take care of what you got. That makes sense to me. Virginia, there’s also a battleship in this budget with a name that’s going to get some attention. Tell us about that.

Virginia Burger (23:29):

Steve, I believe you were referencing the Trump class battleship or the BBG parentheses X. Trump-class battleship’s made a lot of news because it seems almost entirely to be an ego project. It is a ship that no one has asked for to include the Navy. The Navy in fact says, “We don’t need this ship. We don’t want this ship. This is not the ship that we need for the next fight.” Going back to what we talked about earlier with the munitions and epic fury, if you look at Iran and take that as lessons learned about what the next fight might look like, what modern combat is becoming in today’s technology domain, it is clear that sheep distributed mass is what is going to be effective. If we look at the success of the Iranian shahids going up against exquisite American systems like our patriot and Thad, it’s clear that our adversaries have clocked us and said, “If we can just throw a bunch of cheap stuff at them, their expensive stuff will all get taken out and we’re going to be successful.” And that seems to have worked for Iran so far.

(24:40):

If we build something like the Trump battleship, we are just continuing that trend because this battleship is going to be so exquisite. And I mean that pejoratively. This is going to be bad. This is supposed to be the be – all end-all fanciest ship. It’s going to have tactical nukes, it’s going to have rail guns, it’s going to do everything and have all of this stuff. And it’s also maybe gold-plated. We don’t know. But at the end of the day, this is a battleship that is going to be so expensive. Initial assessments for what the first ship might cost I think are somewhere between 14 and $21 billion for one ship. That’s just to get the first one off the line. And those are conservative estimates coming out of the Congressional Budget Office. Right? And this hasn’t even been developed. We don’t have a decent plan for it.

(25:38):

And it’s just going to be a giant exquisite floating target. The Navy has said in their doctrine for modern war, they need cheaper shipping. They need things that can be attritable. They need things that they can create at mass scale, not shiny giant targets that are either going to get taken out immediately by cheap adversarial systems or never get deployed because they’re too fancy to lose and they’re just going to sit on the dock or sit outside the weapons engagement zone and be absolutely no use at the tactical level. And so that’s why we said, no, you don’t get any of this. We’re cutting the Trump battleship completely out of the budget. It is an ego project. It is a vanity project. There is no strategic need for it. The Navy has said they don’t want it. It doesn’t make sense.

Steve Ellis (26:31):

So even name aside, it’s just a bad idea. They

Virginia Burger (26:35):

Could call it the –

Steve Ellis (26:36):

Virginia class? Oh no, there’s already one of those. There’s a submarine.

Virginia Burger (26:40):

That’s true. My brother was on a Virginia class submarine for a while, and that was always fun for me. No, if they called it the Virginia Burger Class battleship, I would still be like, “This is stupid. No, don’t do it.

Steve Ellis (26:52):

” Understood. Gabe, this is the one that I know our listeners, Budget Watchdog, AF Faithful, have been asking about Golden Dome. You wrote a report on this earlier this year. How does the cut list handle golden dome?

Gabe Murphy (27:06):

Well, Steve, we zero it out entirely, at least as far as what they’re formally calling golden dome. Of course, there are some existing missile defense systems that may be part of Golden Dome ultimately that we didn’t zero out or even allowed some increases for in light of the Iran war. But for anything they’re calling golden dome, which is about 17.6 billion, I believe, of the budget requests, we cut all of that funding. And there’s a number of reasons. First, this program, if it is in fact built, would be exceedingly expensive. The American Enterprise Institute estimated that a robust approach to this system would cost $3.6 trillion over the next two decades and still would fail to achieve a reliable defense for the entire country against nuclear weapons, which brings me to the second point that this is just an unviable approach to defending us from nuclear weapons.

(28:07):

The number of space-based interceptors that you would need per missile fired, the ratios are as high as 1,600 to one. Not to mention some of the strategic concerns surrounding this. If we put a ton of space-based interceptors, which are effectively missiles, themselves, into space, that encourages not only Russia and China to pursue further expansions of their nuclear arsenal to get around the possibility that these defenses might be semi-effective. It also encourages them to continue thinking about deploying space-based weapons. And that creates a whole other set of problems given how reliant our entire world really is on satellites and things of that nature. So, I think on many different levels, golden dome is just not a good idea. We understand the need for some, especially theater level missile defense. There is some real practical military utility to that. But as far as defending against nuclear armed ICBMs, this plan just does not make any sense.

(29:06):

So we cut it entirely.

Steve Ellis (29:08):

Got it. All right, let’s end with where the bulk of the taxpayer dollars spent on the military actually end up. Greg, this last one is about contractors, not weapons. Tell us about these Pentagon contractor subsidies as you like to call them.

Greg Williams (29:22):

So I think this is a case of the government not being able to make up its mind what it wants to do. After World War II, much of our defense production capacity came in the form of government owned contractor operated facilities where we said, “We want to build this number of airplanes, this number of shells, this number of missiles, and we’re going to maintain the factory resources necessary to do that and then let contracts to private enterprises to operate those facilities.” Over the years, we shifted in favor of an approach that relied more on the free market it to let people to decide how much they need to invest in facilities to achieve the necessary production rates. But the problem with that was that we didn’t actually buy that many missiles. We didn’t buy that many ships. We didn’t buy that many aircraft and we bought fewer and fewer each year.

(30:17):

And so lo and behold, private industry didn’t invest very much in production facilities. They only invested as much as they needed to meet the numbers that the military was actually buying. And so now we’re sort of trying to put our thumb on the scale to encourage contractors to build more capacity, but not providing them with reliable production orders to justify those expenses. And so that in effect puts the government in the position of making a bad investment, making an investment into factories that aren’t going to see enough business to justify their existence. And so I would much rather the government either decide that we’re going to build the capacity that we want and own it or come up with a way of having predictable orders so that private business does that. But in the meantime, just throwing money at contractors when they don’t produce as much or don’t create as much production capacity as you would like seems like the worst of both worlds to me.

Gabe Murphy (31:26):

And just to add to that, I mean, one of the ways to ensure that we don’t send reliable demand signals to the industry is by budgeting for the Pentagon through reconciliation, which is what this request does. It’s a partisan process that basically ensures that we sort of seesaw between spending every time a Congress or administration changes. And so we see in this budget request these massive increases. We’re talking $50 billion between the Defense Production Act and the Office of Strategic Capital Loan Program to basically give out free money to the industry and give out loans to specific companies. The loans create this perverse incentive where once we loan them money, we’re incentivized to keep giving them business, even if they’re not the best suited for a given contract. And the Defense Production Act is really meant to be for emergencies. And this is a long-term problem in terms of ramping up production on a lot of these things and it should fall to industry, not taxpayers to cover that ramp up.

(32:30):

And I think when we see this huge spike, but at the same time we see industry pouring money into stock buybacks and dividends that increase profits for shareholders and executives, it’s kind of like, “Hey, you clearly have the money to make these investments that you’re saying we need. That shouldn’t be on taxpayers.” So that was part of our thinking here as well.

Steve Ellis (32:53):

Gabe, Greg, Virginia, this is exactly the kind of work that keeps Congress honest when the numbers get this big. Thanks for walking us through your report and congratulations on such a great job.

Greg Williams (33:03):

Well, thank you very much. It’s been a delight to be here.

Virginia Burger (33:05):

Yeah, it was great being here, Steve. Thanks so much.

Greg Williams (33:08):

Thanks Steve.

Gabe Murphy (33:08):

Appreciate it.

Steve Ellis (33:09):

Budget Watchdog AF Faithful, you can find the full report and the complete cut list at taxpayer.net. We’ll have the link in our show notes and there you have it, podcast listeners. With the one and a half trillion dollar Pentagon budget facing stiff headwinds in Congress, this cut list offers lawmakers a half a trillion places to start when it comes to cutting this budget down to size. This is the frequency. Mark it on your dial, subscribe and share and know this, Taxpayers for Common Sense has your back America. We read the bills, we monitor the earmarks, and we highlight the wasteful programs that poorly spent your money and shift long-term risks onto taxpayers. We’ll be back with a new episode soon. I hope you’ll meet us right here to learn more.