At roughly $826.5 billion, defense spending represents more than half of our yearly discretionary budget, and therefore deserves a great deal of scrutiny. At TCS, we focus a lot on so-called legacy weapons systems—older iterations of a weapons system in the services that were developed decades ago and are often based on outmoded operational concepts.

Legacy systems can incur exorbitant maintenance and upgrade costs, draining taxpayer resources that could be better utilized elsewhere. But change is difficult, and there is a well-documented tendency, especially in defense procurement, to take an all-of the-above approach: keep the old AND buy the new. This tension—the need to retire certain systems in favor of newer ones—is most on display as the Marine Corps undergoes a transformation called Force Design 2030 (FD2030).

The Pentagon had to adapt its strategies after the Cold War, shifting from the superpower model to address emerging challenges like asymmetry and counterterrorism. Similarly, after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the services must adapt. FD2030, led by outgoing Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger, aims to redirect the Marine Corps’ attention from countering violent extremists to addressing the challenges posed by near-peer competitors, specifically Russia and China.

Gen. Berger is set to retire on July 10, and while a successor has been chosen, Sen. Tuberville (R-AL) is delaying the confirmation process for military nominees over unrelated policy issues. Berger has sent out invitations to a “relinquishment of office” ceremony and the Commandant post will be vacant for the first time since 1859. The Assistant Commandant, Gen. Eric Smith, has been nominated and will serve as the Acting and Assistant Commandant. Not surprisingly, the close ally of Berger has stated his intention to continue with the transformation plan.

The envisioned future Marine Corps will be a light, highly mobile naval expeditionary force capable of operating in hostile shoreline areas. This necessitates significant changes in organization and equipment. The Marines plan includes reducing or eliminating certain units and military occupational specialties, reorganizing higher echelon Marine formations, and downsizing the force by 12,000 personnel by 2030. Much of this has already begun.

Along with the phase out of units equipped with main battle tanks, there will be a shift from traditional cannon artillery to rockets and missiles. The Navy’s fleet of large amphibious ships will be reduced, making way for the introduction of a new expeditionary ship, the Light Amphibious Warship, designed to be more cost-effective.

Predictably, a group of retired generals, including former Marine Corps Commandants, is campaigning against the Corps’ transformation plans to persuade Congress to halt the changes. Figures like former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and former Joint Chiefs Chair Joe Dunford argue that the proposed changes are too drastic and will diminish the Corps’ capabilities. They particularly highlight concerns over the removal of tanks and heavy armor, which they view as essential in modern combat.

Despite these concerns, resistance from Congress to the proposed changes appears to be diminishing. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed support for the modernization effort but requested more details on the timeline and potential impact on future force structure gaps.

And while the changes proposed under FD2030, such as unit organization, force structure, and weapons acquisition, are already in progress and require a significant investment, the Marine Corps budget has—so far—been mostly reallocated through measures like reducing end strength and retiring or reducing certain weapons systems.

But that line is going to be tough to hold. The pressure and temptation to use FD2030 as an excuse to add to the Pentagon’s already staggering topline budget is obvious. Alternatively, we may see efforts to trim back some of the proposed changes affecting legacy weapons systems to keep existing manufacturing jobs.

It is important for lawmakers to prioritize the Marine Corps’ transformation over parochial political interests tied to specific regions or bases. We have seen other good ideas—fiscal and strategic—fall victim to congressional prerogative to use defense spending as a federal handout.

Lawmakers who support fiscal conservatism should recognize the Marine Corps’ progress in self-funding its transformation by divesting from systems and missions that are not central to the future Marine Corps force, by permitting the divestment of these legacy systems and missions to enable the Marine Corps to allocate resources more efficiently and focus on core capabilities required for the future. And Navy officials should back the Marine Corps’ preferences for future troop-carrying ships. Opting for lighter, more affordable ships like the planned Light Amphibious Warship is the fiscally responsible choice.

We will keep you up to date on the latest turns in the Marine Corps reorganization and, of course, our analysis of the FY24 budget as it comes together.